The structure of logical consequence : proof-theoretic conceptions

Abstract

The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic. We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,855

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-22

Downloads
148 (#81,555)

6 months
4 (#162,565)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

How a Semantics for Tonk Should Be.Andreas Fjellstad - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):488-505.
Bilateralism in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Nissim Francez - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):239-259.
Bilateralism in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Nissim Francez - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-21.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations