Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference

Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429 (2014)
Abstract
I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out that there is an analog of Moore’s Paradox for inference; and I suggest that explaining this phenomenon is a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. Boghossian’s Taking Condition derives its plausibility from the fact that it apparently explains the analog of Moore’s Paradox. Second, in Sect. 3, I show that neither Boghossian’s, nor Broome’s, nor Wright’s account of inference meets my condition of adequacy. I distinguish two kinds of mistake one is likely to make if one does not focus on my condition of adequacy; and I argue that all three—Boghossian, Broome, and Wright—make at least one of these mistakes.
Keywords Inference  Wright  Broome  Boghossian  Moore’s Paradox  Reasoning
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0104-z
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References found in this work BETA
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
Comments on Boghossian.John Broome - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):19-25.
Actions and Events.Wilfrid Sellars - 1973 - Noûs 7 (2):179-202.

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Citations of this work BETA
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.

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