Goodness-Fixing Isn’t Good Enough: A Reply to McHugh and Way

Mind:fzy035 (forthcoming)
Authors
Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Abstract
According to McHugh and Way reasoning is a person-level attitude revision that is regulated by its constitutive aim of getting fitting attitudes. They claim that this account offers an explanation of what is wrong with reasoning in ways one believes to be bad and that this explanation is an alternative to an explanation that appeals to the so-called Taking Condition. I argue that their explanation is unsatisfying.
Keywords reasoning  taking condition  inference  rationality
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzy035
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References found in this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.

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