Inferring by Attaching Force

Authors
Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Abstract
The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I argue that the required 'taking' is neither an intuition nor a belief. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call inferential force to a structured collection of contents.
Keywords inference  reasoning  Taking Condition  intuition
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