Inferring by Attaching Force

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714 (2019)

Authors
Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Abstract
The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.
Keywords inference  reasoning  Taking Condition  intuition
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2018.1564060
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References found in this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Oxford University Press.

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