On Anscombe’s Philosophical Method

Klēsis Revue Philosophique 35:180-198 (2016)
Authors
Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Katharina Nieswandt
Concordia University
Abstract
While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from current alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here we want to begin to fill this lacuna.
Keywords Anscombe  philosophical methodology  linguistic turn  T-philosophy
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