Inference and argument in informal logic

Abstract
We can provisionally distinguish inference as logically drawing some new result out of given information from argument as advancing reasons in support of a challenged claim. Blair and Johnson place inference beyond the scope of informal logic, and Tou lmin considers inference to be the connection of premises with conclusion in a strong argument. Both approaches are inadequate to inference as distinguished here, and partly as a consequence argument analysts tend unwittingly to mark the distinction as t hat between linked and convergent arguments. Here I urge that there are advantages to treating inference as inference.
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