Distinctions of Being: Philosophical Approaches to Reality

Washington, D.C.: American Maritain Association (2012)
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Abstract

What is reality? What are the diverse ways of being? Can God be known from nature? These and other quintessentially metaphysical questions are addressed in the newest volume from the American Maritain Association, Distinctions of Being. Metaphysicsas conceived by Aristotle, extended by Thomas Aquinas, and given modern expression by prominent philosophers such as Jacques Maritaindeals principally with the question of being, the basis of reality. This work considers the necessary distinctions at the heart of metaphysics, the distinctions between nature and spirit; the world and God; and the different forms of knowing in science, philosophy, and being.

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