Naturalist Moral Theory: A Reply to Staddon

Behavior and Philosophy 37:165 - 180 (2009)
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Abstract

In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal contributions to a naturalistic understanding of ethical choice and language

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