In this paper I argue that Bonjour’s claim that empirical beliefs can only be justified by other empirical beliefs and his use of non-normative “spontaneous empirical beliefs” and the “The Doxastic Preumption” fail to solve the problems of coherence theory. I propose a justification of empirical (and other beliefs) based on the work of B. Lonergan.
Keywords l. Bonjour  coherence theory  B. Lonergan
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Reprint years 1998
DOI 10.17161/AJP.1808.9435
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