What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies
Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58 (2005)
Abstract |
David Chalmers argues that consciousness -- authentic, first-person, conscious consciousness -- cannot be reduced to brain events or to any physical event, and that efforts to find a workable mind-body identity theory are, therefore, doomed in principle. But for Chalmers and non-reductionist in general consciousness consists exclusively, or at least paradigmatically, of phenomenal or qualia-consciousness. This results in a seriously inadequate understanding both of consciousness and of the “hard problem.” I describe other, higher-order cognitional events which must be conscious if the “hard problem” is to be solved -- in any sense of ‘solve’ which would make us any the wiser about it -- but whose consciousness is quite different from the qualia and phenomena usually inventoried. Events of this kind are both part of the hard problem and the means by which we will solve it, if we ever do
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Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Eugene O. Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness.George A. Mashour & Eric LaRock - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1163-1168.
Chalmers' Fading and Dancing Qualla.Liam P. Dempsey - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
I Can't Get No (Epistemic) Satisfaction: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness Entails a Hard Problem of Explanation.Brian D. Earp - 2012 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
Chalmers's Fading and Dancing Qualia: Consciousness and the "Hard Problem".L. Dempsey - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2013 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.
There is No Hard Problem of Consciousness.Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302.
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Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.
Human Zombies Are Metaphysically Impossible.William Robert Webster - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):297-310.
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2009-01-28
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