Mind 122 (486):373-417 (2013)

Authors
Christoph Hoerl
University of Warwick
Abstract
Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. I distinguish three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against a rival view sometimes called extensionalism. I examine these arguments in light of the individuation argument. In particular, I show that the individuation argument is, at least prima facie, neutral between those two views of temporal experience; and once the individuation argument is in place, the unity and causal argument also lose their force against extensionalism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzt070
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

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Citations of this work BETA

Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage?Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
Experience of and in Time.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
Time and the Domain of Consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326:90-96.

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