Moralbegründung ohne metaphysik

Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):225 - 238 (1983)
It is claimed that some important moral rules — more precisely: the social establishment of such rules — can best be argued for in terms of hypothetical imperatives, addressed to each member of the society in question. The main presuppositions of this conception of morality are analysed and the implications of it for the relations between morality on the one hand and such things as prudence, sanctions, and equality on the other are examined.
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Review. [REVIEW]Rainer Hegselmann - 1987 - Erkenntnis 26 (2):143-159.
Review. [REVIEW]Rainer Hegselmann - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (1):143-159.

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