A puzzle about truth and singular propositions

Mind 112 (448):635-651 (2003)
Abstract
It seems that every singular proposition implies that the object it is singular with respect to exists. It also seems that some propositions are true with respect to possible worlds in which they do not exist. The puzzle is that it can be argued that there is contradiction between these two principles. In this paper, I explain the puzzle and consider some of the ways one might attempt to resolve it. The puzzle is important because it has implications concerning the way we think about the relationship between a proposition and the claim that the proposition is true.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/112.448.635
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,520
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
On the Mind Dependence of Truth.Diego Marconi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.
On the Mind Dependence of Truth.Diego Marconi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):301-318.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
106 ( #48,118 of 2,180,853 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #154,335 of 2,180,853 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums