Defining Qualitative Properties

Erkenntnis:1-16 (forthcoming)

Authors
Vera Hoffmann-Kolss
University of Cologne
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic account of the metaphysically important distinction between haecceitistic properties, such as being David Lewis or being acquainted with David Lewis, and qualitative properties, such as being red or being acquainted with a famous philosopher. I first argue that this distinction is hyperintensional, that is, that cointensional properties can differ in whether they are qualitative. Then I develop an analysis of the qualitative/haecceitistic distinction according to which haecceitistic properties are relational in a certain sense. I argue that this analysis can capture the hyperintensionality of the qualitative/haecceitistic distinction and is generally in accordance with the use of the notion of a qualitative property in philosophical debates.
Keywords properties  qualitative properties  haecceitistic properties  haecceitism  hyperintensionality
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9991-x
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References found in this work BETA

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