Hume on the Distinction of Reason

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1131-1141 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper concerns Hume’s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume’s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume’s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson).

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Citations of this work

Hume on Distinctions of Reason: A Resemblance-First Interpretation.Taro Okamura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):423-436.
Type distinctions of reason and Hume’s Separability Principle.Hsueh Qu - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):90-111.

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References found in this work

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.
Intrinsic/extrinsic.I. L. Humberstone - 1996 - Synthese 108 (2):205-267.

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