David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 21 (3):300-313 (2008)
According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of 'independence of (extralinguistic) facts'. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open.
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Schulte (2011). Truthmakers: A Tale of Two Explanatory Projects. Synthese 181 (3):413-431.
Aaron M. Griffith (2015). How Negative Truths Are Made True. Synthese 192 (1):317-335.
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