It's not the end of the world: when a subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism fails

Analysis 71 (1):44-53 (2011)
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Abstract

Metaphysical nihilism is the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Thomas Baldwin (1996) offers an argument for metaphysical nihilism. The premisses of the argument purport to provide a procedure of subtraction that can be iterated until we reach a world where no concrete objects exist. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) finds fault with Baldwin’s argument, modifies it, and claims to have proved metaphysical nihilism. My primary aim is to show that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s alleged proof rests on a false assumption. The assumption is that, necessarily, if there are no concrete* objects (in the sense Rodriguez-Pereyra defines), then there are no concrete objects. My secondary aim, with which I begin, is to formulate and then strengthen a succinct version of the subtraction argument.

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Aviv Hoffmann
Hebrew University of Jerusalem