Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic

The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (209)
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Abstract

Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely tied to two conceptions of deductive logic, and it is the key, I argue, for understanding first the connection between meaning and inferential role, and second what the paradoxes show more generally.

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Thomas Hofweber
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Inconsistency in natural languages.Jody Azzouni - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184.
Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.
On Using Inconsistent Expressions.Arvid Båve - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
Exceptional Logic.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-37.

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References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.

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