Limits of truth: Exploring epistemological approaches to argumentation

Informal Logic 25 (3):245-260 (2005)

Abstract
Some proponents of epistemological approaches to argumentation assume that it should be possible to develop non-relative criteria of argument evaluation. By contrast, this paper argues that any evaluation of an argument depends on the cognitive situation of the evaluator, on background knowledge that is available for this evaluator in a certain situation, and --in some cases--on the belief-value-system this person shares
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.
Argumentation and Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):27-49.

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