Analysis 79 (2):202-206 (2019)

Christian Piller
University of York
It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any081
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.

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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.

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