Norm-reasons and evidentialism

Analysis 79 (2):202-206 (2019)
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Abstract

It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context.

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Citations of this work

Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):1-18.
Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):667-684.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.

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