On the relation between the probabilistic characterization of the common cause and Bell׳s notion of local causality

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 49:32-41 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In the paper the relation between the standard probabilistic characterization of the common cause and Bell's notion of local causality will be investigated. It will be shown that the probabilistic common cause follows from local causality if one accepts, as Bell did, two assumptions concerning the common cause: first, the common cause is localized in the intersection of the past of the correlating events; second, it provides a complete specification of the `beables' of this intersection. However, neither assumptions are a priori requirements. In the paper the logical role of these assumptions will be studied and it will be shown that only the second assumption is necessary for the derivation of the probabilistic common cause from local causality.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

23 (#705,674)

6 months
69 (#76,259)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

La Nouvelle Cuisine.J. S. Bell - 1987 - In John Stewart Bell (ed.), Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 232--248.
Beables for quantum field theory.J. S. Bell - 1987 - In Basil J. Hiley & D. Peat (eds.), Quantum Implications: Essays in Honour of David Bohm. Methuen. pp. 227--234.
Events and processes in the quantum world.Abner Shimony - 1986 - In Roger Penrose & C. J. Isham (eds.), Quantum concepts in space and time. New York ;: Oxford University Press. pp. 182--203.

View all 23 references / Add more references