The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns

Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949 (2010)
Abstract
Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth. I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and draw some lessons for the soundness of its conception of truth
Keywords Truth  Deflationism  Minimalism  Horwich
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00336.x
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.

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