Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability

Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299 (2008)

Authors
Glen Hoffmann
York University
Abstract
The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic theories of truth are widely acknowledged to be. Sustained analysis reveals that the unrestricted formal legitimacy argument is firmly grounded in first person conceivability evidence.
Keywords Truth  Superassertability  Pragmatism  Conceivability
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-008-9125-9
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