A Case for Increased Caution in End of Life Decisions for Disorders of Consciousness

Monash Bioethics 28 (2):13.1-13.13 (2009)
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Abstract

Disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state. Such patients are often regarded as unconscious. This has consequences for end of life decisions for these patients: it is much easier to justify withdrawing life support for unconscious than conscious patients. Recent brain imaging research has however suggested that some patients may in fact be conscious.

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Jakob Hohwy
Monash University

Citations of this work

Pure Experience and Disorders of Consciousness.Laura Specker Sullivan - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (2):107-114.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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