A reduction of kripke-wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning

Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68 (2003)
Abstract
A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does (Kripke, 1982). In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken
Keywords Disposition  Logic  Meaning  Normativity  Paradox  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1022988632310
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,769
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein.George M. Wilson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):99-122.
On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein.A. Collins - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.
Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein.Michael Kremer - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):571-584.
Meaning Skepticism and Normativity.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
Meaning, Mistake, and Miscalculation.Paul Coates - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Alexander Miller - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (199):161-174.
Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity.Josefa Toribio - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):399-413.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

91 ( #56,054 of 2,158,887 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #193,365 of 2,158,887 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums