Can neuroscience explain consciousness?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):180-198 (2004)
Abstract
Cognitive neuroscience aspires to explain how the brain produces conscious states. Many people think this aspiration is threatened by the subjective nature of introspective reports, as well as by certain philosophical arguments. We propose that good neuroscientific explanations of conscious states can consolidate an interpretation of introspective reports, in spite of their subjective nature. This is because the relative quality of explanations can be evaluated on independent, methodological grounds. To illustrate, we review studies that suggest that aspects of the feeling of being in control of one's bodily movement can be explained in terms of the complex and surprising way the brain predicts movement. This is a modest type of functional, contrastive explanation. Though we do not refute the threatening philosophical arguments, we show that they do not apply to this type of explanation.
Keywords Consciousness  Neuroscience
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Citations of this work BETA
The Self in Action: Lessons From Delusions of Control.Chris Frith - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.
The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.
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Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having.Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.
Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.

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