Prediction error minimization, mental and developmental disorder, and statistical theories of consciousness

In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition; this theory is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global neuronal workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception; furthermore, this theory can subsume and unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness, in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for selection of representational content into consciousness

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.
Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.David Rosenthal - 2012 - Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
On a Searlean Objection to Rosenthal’s Theory of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):83-100.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-11-23

Downloads
210 (#87,777)

6 months
12 (#122,866)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jakob Hohwy
Monash University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references