Aristotle’s Account of Moral Perception (EN.VI.8) & Nussbaum’s Priority of the Particular Thesis

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77 (1):357-380 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Consider a contemporary retrieval of Aristotle’s account of moral perception. Drawing from EN.VI.8, Martha Nussbaum argues that we perceive moral particulars prior to ethical principles. First, I explain her priority of the particular thesis. The virtuous person perceives value in the world, as part of her moral deliberation. This perceptual skill is an important aspect of her virtuous activity, and hence also part of her eudaimonia. Second, I present her priority thesis with a dilemma: our perception of moral particulars is either non-inferential or it is inferential. If Nussbaum accepts a non-inferential interpretation, then she is committed to an unsavory view about moral epistemology –one that invites intuitionism and relativism. But if she accepts a non-inferential account, then the moral particular is no longer prior to the ethical principle. I suggest that her better option is to grab the second horn. This move avoids the problems of the first horn without sacrificing her neo-Aristotelian commitments or her overarching view that the perception of moral particulars is ineliminable to moral deliberation. At the same time, this move renders her priority thesis trivial.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Dilemmas and the Priority Thesis.Julie Mary Mcdonald - 1987 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (2):164-181.
A hard look at moral perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
Moral perception and moral knowledge.Robert Audi - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
Murdochian Moral Perception.W. Scott Clifton - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (3):207-220.
Merleau-Ponty, Moral Perception, and Metaethical Internalism.Bryan Lueck - 2020 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34 (3):265-273.
The case for moral perception.J. Jeremy Wisnewski - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):129-148.
Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension.Xinyan Jiang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:215-220.
Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-04-30

Downloads
24 (#560,118)

6 months
5 (#244,526)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin Hole
College of Lake County

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations