A neuropsychological challenge to the sentimentalism/rationalism distinction

Synthese 195 (5):1873-1889 (2018)

Critical reflection on the available neuropsychological evidence suggests that the roles of emotion and reason in moral judgment may not be distinct. This casts significant doubt on our current understanding of moral judgment, and therefore also on all philosophical theories based on that understanding. Most notably, it raises doubts about both sentimentalism and rationalism, which historically have often been treated as exclusive and exhaustive theories regarding the nature of moral concepts. As an alternative, I endorse pluralism with regard to the emotional and rational nature of moral concepts.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1344-9
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,405
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred From Neuroimaging Data?Russell A. Poldrack - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):59-63.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Normative Moral Neuroscience: The Third Tradition of Neuroethics.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):411-431.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Judgment.P. J. E. Kail - 2013 - In James A. Harris (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 315.
Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology.Michael Slote - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 219--239.
Moral Sense and Sentimentalism.Julia Driver - 2013 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 358.
Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas.András Szigeti - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.
Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Sentimentalisme Moral Et Point de Vue General.Shimbi Kamba Katchelewa - 2002 - Dissertation, Universite de Montreal (Canada)
Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives.Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.


Added to PP index

Total views
18 ( #509,114 of 2,286,192 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #413,633 of 2,286,192 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature