Ratio 31 (3):303-311 (2018)

Authors
Tsung-Hsing Ho
National Chung Cheng University
Abstract
Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.
Keywords moral luck  achievement   virtue epistemology  value of knowledge  John Greco  Ernest Sosa
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/rati.12188
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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