Theory and Decision 80 (4):623-648 (2016)

Conventional economic theory assumes that agents should be consistent across decisions. However, it is often observed that experimental subjects fail to report consistent preferences. So far, these inconsistencies are almost always examined singly. We thus wonder whether the more inconsistent individuals in one task are also more inconsistent in other tasks. We propose an experiment in which subjects are asked to report their preferences over risky bets so as to obtain, for each subject, three measures of inconsistencies: classical preference reversals, framing effects and preference instability. In line with previous experimental findings, subjects are largely inconsistent according to each of these three measures and there are considerable individual differences. The main result is that we find no correlation among these three measures of inconsistency.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11238-015-9518-8
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,981
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making.Shane Frederick - 2005 - Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4):25-42.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Bivariate Risk Premia.Christophe Courbage - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (1):29-34.


Added to PP index

Total views
26 ( #397,302 of 2,403,575 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #551,240 of 2,403,575 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes