Kantian Review 25 (3):365-388 (2020)

Many of us are all too familiar with the experience of taking pleasure in things we feel we ought not, and of finding it frustratingly hard to bring our pleasures into line with our moral judgements. As a value dualist, Kant draws a sharp contrast between the two sources of practical motivation: pleasure in the agreeable and respect for the moral law. His ethics might thus seem to be an unpromising source for help in thinking about how we can bring our agreeable pleasures into line with our moral values. But I argue that a careful reading of Kant’s texts reveals a helpfully realistic view about the extent to which we can modify our agreeable pleasures. On my interpretation, Kant shows us how to hold together two seemingly incompatible ideas: on the one hand, that pleasure in the agreeable is resistant to rational direction, and on the other hand, that we can cultivate these pleasures with a view to ethical self-transformation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1369415420000205
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,536
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Rationally Agential Pleasure? A Kantian Proposal.Keren Gorodeisky - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: a History. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-194.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Restorative Aesthetic Pleasures and the Restoration of Pleasure.Ryan Paul Doran - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1):73-78.
Six Theses About Pleasure.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.
A New Look at Kant's Theory of Pleasure.Rachel Zuckert - 2002 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (3):239–252.
Impure Intellectual Pleasure and the Phaedrus.Kelly E. Arenson - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):21-45.
No, It Isn’T: A Response to Law on Evil Pleasure.Richard Playford - 2018 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 17 (1):1-12.
The Nature and Types of Pleasure in Sohrewardi’s View.’Einollah Khademi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 14 (55-56):75-98.
On Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2011 - Dissertation, Geneva
Pleasure's Place.Karl Ameriks - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1):67-72.
Rediscovering the Sense of Pleasure in Morality.M. Lorenz Moises J. Festin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:101-108.
Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):510-524.
The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 307-337.


Added to PP index

Total views
5 ( #1,119,919 of 2,385,586 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #162,945 of 2,385,586 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes