Emotion as a Basis of Belief

Grazer Philosophische Studien 35 (1):67-71 (1989)
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In 'Knowing That One Knows', Roderick Chisholm suggests that perceptual experiences are the paradigmatic substrates of beliefs of the highest epistemic credibility about the experiences. But perceptual experiences are not the only experiences capable of justifying such higher-order beliefs. In this article I briefly examine the project of generalizing Chisholm's account of the justification of higher-order beliefs to include justification by emotional experience. In the course of doing this, I will argue that Chisholm's account is too closely tied to the perceptual case to be so generalized, and I will briefly indicate some of what is involved in countenancing emotional experiences as epistemic justifiers.



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