From Determinism to Resignation, and How to Stop It

In Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillman Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

A few philosophers have held that determinism should lead to an attitude of resignation: since what will be will be, there is no point trying to influence the future. That argument has rightly been seen as mistaken. But a plausible parallel argument leads from the thesis of predictability---the thesis that it can be known what will happen---to an attitude of resignation. So if predictability is true, our normal practical attitudes may well be deeply mistaken. Fortunately, whilst determinism is a plausible doctrine, there is a strong argument against predictability. Determinism and predictability should be kept well apart.

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Richard Holton
Cambridge University

References found in this work

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Causation.David Lewis - 1986 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
Scriven on human unpredictability.David K. Lewis & Jane Shelby Richardson - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (5):69-74.

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