Intention as a Model for Belief

In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
This paper argues that a popular account of intentions can be extended to beliefs. Beliefs are stable all-out states that allow for planning and coordination in a way that is tractable for cognitively limited creatures like human beings. Scepticism is expressed that there is really anything like credences as standardly understood.
Keywords Intention  Belief  Credence
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Citations of this work BETA
Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.
When Obstinacy is a Better Policy.Justin Dallmann - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.
Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation.Krista Lawlor - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):1-27.

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