Intentions, response-dependence, and immunity from error

In P. Menzies (ed.), Response Dependent Concepts. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 1 (1991)
Abstract
You are, I suspect, exceedingly good at knowing what you intend to do. In saying this I pay you no special compliment. Knowing what one intends is the normal state to be in. And this cries out for some explanation. How is it that we are so authoritative about our own intentions? There are two different approaches that one can take in answering this question. The first credits us with special perceptual powers which we use when we examine our own minds. On this view we detect our own mental states in much the same way that we detect the state of the world around us; but the powers we direct inward are much less prone t o error than those we direct outwards. The alternative approach denies that there is such a thing as inward perception. On this view the whole idea the we detect our own mental states using some kind of internal perceptual apparatus is misguided; a wholly different account is needed.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,781
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Truth, Meaning, and Circularity.Claire Horisk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269-300.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Acceptance-Dependence: A Social Kind of Response-Dependence.Frank A. Hindriks - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
Intention Detecting.Richard Holton - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):298-318.
Intentions Are Mental States.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.
Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
'I'-Thoughts and Explanation: Reply to Garrett.José Luis Bermúdez - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):432–436.
How We Know What We Intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Biological Functions and Perceptual Content.Mohan P. Matthen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
Rational and Irrational Intentions: An Argument for Externalism.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 2002 - In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle. De Gruyter. pp. 163-174.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
51 ( #106,276 of 2,199,496 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #299,438 of 2,199,496 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature