Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371 (2019)

Authors
Ben Holguín
Princeton University
Abstract
This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
Keywords lying  knowledge  belief  assertion  Gettier cases
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02407-2
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying: Knowledge or Belief?Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
Hedged Testimony.Peter Van Elswyk - forthcoming - Noûs.
True Lies and Moorean Redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.

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