Classical Quarterly 6 (3-4):215- (1956)
A Fragment of ancient philosophy is like a code message which it is the task of the scholar to decipher. The cryptogram has come down to us, but not the key. In case this beginning should be thought obvious by anyone, let me say at once that I do not believe a word of it, though I believe that the attitude it epitomizes is by no means uncommon and is part of the explanation of a tendency to mishandle philosophical fragments. The attitude is to be found, for example, in some things M. Untersteiner has said in his recently translated book on the Sophists1 about the meaning of the well-known statement of Protagoras
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Making Sense Out of Inner Sense.Guenter Zoeller - 1989 - International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):263-270.
Philosophical Investigations, 4th Edition (Trans. Hacker and Schulte).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 2009 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Participatory Sense-Making.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
In Search of Sense in Common Sense Management.Joseph Z. Nitecki - 1987 - Journal of Business Ethics 6 (8):639 - 647.
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories.Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
Review of Making Sense. A Theory of Interpretation. [REVIEW]Jennifer A. McMahon - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):107 – 109.
Deleuze, Jonas, and Thompson Toward a New Transcendental Aesthetic and a New Question of Panpsychism.John Protevi - unknown
Sense, Category, Questions: Reading Deleuze with Ryle.Peter Kügler - 2011 - Deleuze Studies 5 (3):324-339.
Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti - 2013 - In S. J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Added to index2010-12-09
Total downloads4 ( #633,665 of 2,153,481 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #399,080 of 2,153,481 )
How can I increase my downloads?