Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against anti-physicalist arguments invokes the existence of ‘phenomenal concepts’. These are concepts that designate conscious experiences from a first person perspective, and hence differ from physicalistic concepts; but not in a way that precludes co-referentiality with them. On one version of this strategy phenomenal concepts are seen as (1) type demonstratives that have (2) no mode of presentation. However, 2 is possible without 1-call this the ‘bare recognitional concept’ view-and I will argue that this avoids certain recent criticisms while retaining the virtue of finessing the ‘mode of presentation’ problem for phenomenal concepts. But construing phenomenal concepts this way seems to not do justice to the phenomenology of conscious experience. In this paper I examine whether or not this impression can be borne out by a good argument. As it turns out, it is harder to do so than one might think. It can be done, but it involves somewhat more convoluted reasoning than one might have supposed necessary. Having shown that, I will end with a few brief remarks on what my argument means for attempts to preserve a physicalist account of consciousness

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):97-127.
Phenomenal concepts, color experience, and Mary's puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2012 - Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.
Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162.
Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-02

Downloads
165 (#117,742)

6 months
20 (#133,253)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque. E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.

Add more citations