Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality

Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is considering, since different starting points will typically produce different assessments of what the evidence is and how it should be weighed. Feldman argues that there cannot be equally reasonable starting points, but his extension of the postulate of completely shared evidence to evidence for starting points involves an illicit assimilation of ordinary cases of evidence assessment to cases in which substantial agreement about background assumptions is lacking. I also clarify why even if Feldman were correct about what epistemic norms require, his conclusion would not show that we should actually suspend judgment about religious or anti-religious truth claims
Keywords Feldman  Religious disagreements  Epistemic rationality  Suspension of judgment  Evidentialism  Epistemic peers  Shared evidence  agnosticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-012-9366-1
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References found in this work BETA

Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - The Personalist Forum 5 (2):149-152.

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The Epistemology of Religion.Martin Smith - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):135-147.

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