Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):251 – 266 (1993)

Dale Lynn Holt
Mississippi State University
Recent experimental work by T.D. Wilson et al. indicates that a consequence of asking subjects to reflect on their attitudes is that they not only reduce the consistency between their attitudes and behavior, but they perform actions which they come to regret. Wilson interprets this work via intra-psychic concepts, and arrives at the conclusion that it is rational to avoid deliberating about a wide range of attitudes and behaviors. This consequence has objectionable implications for philosophical theories of deliberative practical rationality. I respond to this challenge by reinterpreting the experimental results in a way which is not only consistent with a certain theory of deliberative practical rationality but in which the results lend support to that theory. My interpretive focus is on attending closely to the social circumstances of subjects in the experiments[1].
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DOI 10.1080/09515089308573091
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References found in this work BETA

Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of Judgments.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (4):250-256.
In D. Bar-Tal & AW Kruglanski.M. P. Zanna & J. K. Rempel - 1988 - In Daniel Bar-Tal & Arie W. Kruglanski (eds.), The Social Psychology of Knowledge. Editions de la Maison des Sciences de L'homme. pp. 315--354.

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