Reason, value and the muggletonians

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):484 – 487 (1996)
Michael Smith has argued that to value an action is to believe that if one were fully rational one would desire that one perform it. I offer the Muggletonians as a counter-example. The Muggletonians, a 17th century English sect, believed that reason was the path of the Devil. They believed that their fully rational selves - rational in just Smith's sense - would have blasphemed against God; and that their rational selves would have wanted their actual selves to do likewise. But blaspheming against God was not what they valued.
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DOI 10.1080/00048409612347451
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References found in this work BETA
Valuing: Desiring or Believing?Michael Smith - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 323--60.

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Citations of this work BETA
How Not to Be Muddled by a Meddlesome Muggletonian.John Bigelow & Michael Smith - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):511 – 527.

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