The Problem of Intransigently Biased Agents

Philosophy of Science 82 (5):956-968 (2015)
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Abstract

In recent years the social nature of scientific inquiry has generated considerable interest. We examine the effect of an epistemically impure agent on a community of honest truth seekers. Extending a formal model of network epistemology pioneered by Zollman, we conclude that an intransigently biased agent prevents the community from ever converging to the truth. We explore two solutions to this problem, including a novel procedure for endogenous network formation in which agents choose whom to trust. We contend that our model nicely captures aspects of current problems in medical research and gesture at some morals for medical epistemology more generally

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Author Profiles

Bennett Holman
Yonsei University
Justin Bruner
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Scientific polarization.Cailin O’Connor & James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):855-875.
Experimentation by Industrial Selection.Bennett Holman & Justin Bruner - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1008-1019.
Robustness and Idealizations in Agent-Based Models of Scientific Interaction.Daniel Frey & Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1411-1437.

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