Dissertation, University of Oslo (2007)

Authors
Heine A. Holmen
University of Tromsø
Abstract
The following thesis discusses a range of central aspects in Timothy Williamson’s so-called «knowledge-first» epistemology. In particular, it adresses whether this kind of epistemological framework is apt to answer the challenges of scepticism.
Keywords The Metapysichs of Knowledge  Knowledge-First Epistemology  Scepticism  Timothy Williamson  Scepticism  The Nature of Knowledge  Assertion  Knowledge as a Mental State  Philosophy of Mind
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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