Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):215–236 (2000)

Marcia Homiak
Occidental College
At Treatise 581ff., Hume seems to ground moral distinctions in therational deliberations of the observer, thereby making sentiment expendable.Is Hume then an example of an early modern ethicist, for whom moral distinctions are derived from reason alone? I argue that Hume's use of strategiesfrom ancient ethics can help explain how reason remains subordinate to sentiment.For if to take up the point of view of the judicious spectator we musthave the right constellation of sentiments and passions , then moral distinctions are only derivatively based onreason
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00103
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,242
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
27 ( #388,910 of 2,419,525 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,629 of 2,419,525 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes