Moore and Schaffer on the Ontology of Omissions

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-89 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Michael Moore’s and Jonathan Schaffer’s views on the ontology of omissions in context of their stances on the problem of omissive causation. First, I consider, from a general point of view, the question of the ontology of omissions, and how it relates to the problem of omissive causation. Then I describe Moore’s and Schaffer’s particular views on omissions and how they combine with their stances on the problem of omissive causation. I charge Moore and Schaffer with inconsistencies and insufficiencies within their overall theories, and consider their replies. Finally, I propose my own view on the ontology of omissions and solution to the problem of omissive causation

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David Hommen
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

References found in this work

Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Contrastive causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.

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