Philosophy of Science 35 (3):232-247 (1968)

Abstract
It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate "grue" presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these "difficulties" has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that "grue" raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intuitive appeal offered. However "grue" is shown to raise an informal, "over-arching" difficulty of great magnitude for all theories of confirmation, including Hempel's theory
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DOI 10.1086/288211
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Logic of Confirmation.Carl A. Hempel - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
A Query on Confirmation.Nelson Goodman - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.
A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation.Carl G. Hempel - 1943 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):122-143.

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Citations of this work BETA

Goodman’s “New Riddle‘.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613-643.
A Conciliatory Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):45-64.
Anything Confirms Anything?Herbert E. Hendry & James E. Roper - 1980 - Synthese 45 (2):217 - 232.

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