Authors
Christopher Hookway
University of Sheffield
Abstract
The paper explores Quine's ?naturalized epistemology?, investigating whether its adoption would prevent the description or vindication of normative standards standardly employed in regulating beliefs and inquiries. Quine's defence of naturalized epistemology rejects traditional epistemological questions rather than using psychology to answer them. Although one could persuade those sensitive to the force of traditional epistemological problems only by employing the kind of argument whose philosophical relevance Quine is committed to denying, Quine can support his view by showing how scientific inquiry need not confront any evaluative issues which cannot be addressed in naturalistic terms. A survey of Quine's own epistemological writings supports this account of his position: naturalized epistemology, it is argued, requires acceptance of the shallowness of epistemic reflection, and traditional epistemology employs general epistemic norms and principles which Quine endeavours to show that we can do without. The closing sections of the paper argue that Quine can consistently resist recent criticisms by Alvin Plantinga in spite of the fact that an unsympathetic reader could reasonably be unimpressed by this resistance. Finally, an attempt is made to understand the normative role of Quine's empiricism and of his claim that prediction is the checkpoint of inquiry
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201749408602368
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,159
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Roots of Reference.W. V. Quine - 1974 - Lasalle, Ill., Open Court.
The Legacy of Skepticism.Thompson Clarke - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (20):754.
Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized.Hilary Putnam - 1985 - In Synthese. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-24.
Why Reason Can’T Be Naturalized.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 52 (1):229--47.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Anti-Foundationalism and the Vienna Circle's Revolution in Philosophy.Thomas E. Uebel - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):415-440.
Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation.Christopher Hookway - 1997 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:197-.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Two Faces of Quine's Naturalism.Susan Haack - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):335 - 356.
Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology and the Third Dogma of Empiricism.Robert Sinclair - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):455-472.
Quine and Davidson: Two Naturalized Epistemologists.Roger F. Gibson - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):449 – 463.
Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking? [REVIEW]Wybo Houkes - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):251-267.
Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism.Stephen Stich - 1993 - In C. Hookway & D. Peterson (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-02-04

Total views
65 ( #166,286 of 2,454,824 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #225,739 of 2,454,824 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes