Ross-style pluralism versus rule-consequentialism

Mind 105 (420):531-552 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper employs (and defends where needed) a familiar four-part methodology for assessing moral theories. This methodology makes the most popular kind of moral pluralism--here called Ross-style pluralism--look extremely attractive. The paper contends, however, that, if rule-consequentialism's implications match our considered moral convictions as well as Ross-style pluralism's implications do, the methodology makes rule-consequentialism look even more attractive than Ross-style pluralism. The paper then attacks two arguments recently put forward in defence of Ross-style pluralism. One of these arguments is that no moral theory containing some single normative principle to justify general pro tanto duties can do justice to the ineliminable role of judgment in moral thinking. The other argument is that no such theory is plausible in light of the fact that our moral ideas come from disparate historical sources

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
129 (#95,193)

6 months
3 (#208,566)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Brad Hooker
University of Reading

Citations of this work

Rule Consequentialism and Scope.Leonard Kahn - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):631-646.
Rule-Consequentialism's Dilemma.Iain Law - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):263-276.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references