Critical Reasoning and Critical Perception

In Matthew Kieran & Dominic Lopes (eds.), Knowing Art. Springer. pp. 137-153 (2006)
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Abstract

The outcome of criticism is a perception. Does this mean that criticism cannot count as a rational process? For it to do so, it seems it would have to be possible for there to be an argument for a perception. Yet perceptions do not seem to be the right sort of item to serve as the conclusions of arguments. Is this appearance borne out? I examine why perceptions might not be able to play that role, and explore what would have to be true of critical discourse for those obstacles to be circumvented.

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Robert Hopkins
New York University

Citations of this work

Aesthetic Rationality.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):113-140.
Aesthetic knowledge.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2507-2535.
Inference as Consciousness of Necessity.Eric Marcus - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):304-322.
The concept of the aesthetic.James Shelley - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Art Criticism as Practical Reasoning.Anthony Cross - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (3):299-317.

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